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A TALE OF TWO FLEETS
A Russian Perspective on the 1973 Naval Standoff in the
Mediterranean
Lyle J. Goldstein and Yuri M. Zhukov
Slightly more than three decades have passed since the United States and theSoviet Union confronted the most severe maritime crisis of the Cold War. Oc-
curring when the strategic focus of the U.S. Navy had been on the Vietnam War
for several years, this standoff witnessed the effective exploitation of American
political, strategic, and tactical vulnerabilities by an adversary that ten years
prior had had virtually no Mediterranean naval pres-
ence whatsoever. Indeed, this substantial maritime
challenge had emerged from a continental power that
had traditionally focused its naval strategy exclusively
on coastal defense.
In an age when the many battles of the global war
on terror could distract the U.S. Navy from its core
mission of sea control, this often forgotten episode of
superpower brinksmanship is a timely reminder that
naval threats can emerge rapidly. The Mediterranean
crisis demonstrates that America’s opponents could
achieve local sea-denial capabilities in the face of se-
vere constraints, even in a theater of traditional U.S.
naval dominance.
In examining Soviet maritime strategy in the Medi-
terranean before and during the October 1973
Arab-Israeli War, this study draws on new evidence
from Russia made available through cooperation with
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the Central Naval Museum in St. Petersburg, interviews with ex-Soviet naval of-
ficers, and newly available Russian memoirs and military journals. These new
sources—many of which have never before been exploited by Western ana-
lysts—include an unpublished personal journal of Captain First Rank Yevgenii
V. Semenov, one-time chief of staff of the Soviet Fifth Eskadra (the Mediterra-
nean squadron). It offers day-by-day accounts of ship movements and firsthand
insight into Soviet strategic thinking.1
This new evidence paints a picture of a Fifth Eskadra on the verge of direct in-
tervention and much more willing to engage in hostilities than previously
thought. This work stands in contrast to scholarly works on the topic that have
tended to emphasize Soviet restraint and reluctance to exercise force in local
conflicts.2 In addition, this study has empirical value in that most previous un-
classified sources have relied almost exclusively on an American viewpoint.3
Russian perspectives can help us understand the significant challenges faced by a
land power in creating and employing an oceangoing fleet.
THE CARIBBEAN PARALLEL
The Mediterranean standoff naturally brings to mind its more famous predeces-
sor, the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Whereas, the earlier crisis demonstrated the
importance of naval might in enabling both flexibility and political leverage, in
the later episode described here the more balanced capabilities of the opposing
fleets formed a major constraint on U.S. decision makers during the crisis, lead-
ing to a much more ambiguous outcome.
The U.S. maritime advantage during the Cuban missile crisis was over-
whelming and incontestable. President John F. Kennedy chose the naval block-
ade option—as opposed to immediate ground invasion, surgical air strikes,
further diplomatic pressure, or simple inaction—largely because the prospect of
a naval confrontation with the Soviets was the opening scenario most favorable
to Washington.4
Post-Stalin cutbacks in naval construction had left the Soviet fleet’s blue-
water ambitions effectively moribund. The Caribbean represented for Soviet
captains an unfamiliar area of operation at a prohibitive distance from home
ports. Moscow was unable to support or even effectively resupply or reinforce its
land-based forces in Cuba from the sea.5 Soviet merchant ships heading to Ha-
vana were generally unescorted; usable naval forces in the region were virtually
nonexistent.6
Four Soviet long-range diesel submarines (of a type known to NATO as
the Foxtrot class and to the Soviet Navy as “project 641”) under the com-
mand of Captain First Rank Vitalii Agafonov—each carrying twenty-two
conventional torpedoes and one nuclear-tipped weapon—left the Northern
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Fleet on 1 October for a new
base in Havana.7 They faced
the unenviable task of pene-
trating a U.S. blockade con-
ducted by (on average) forty
ships, 240 aircraft, and thirty
thousand personnel.8 In ad-
dition to this overwhelming
force, the Soviet submariners
were tackling immense tech-
nical and mechanical difficul-
t ies. Since Soviet nuclear
submarines were at that time
relatively unsafe and untested,
older diesel boats were sent in their place.9 The diesel Foxtrots proved unsuitable
for the operation. The boats, especially in that climate, were hot; temperatures
inside reached 50°C (122°F), forcing the crew to cool off by sitting neck deep in
water. The boats also lacked cooling systems for their batteries, which greatly
complicated recharging. The Foxtrots furthermore had to surface often to re-
ceive instructions from Moscow and recharge batteries.10
The noisy engines and regular surfacing made the boats particularly vulnera-
ble to U.S. antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces. Land-based hydroacoustic in-
stallations discovered the submarines off the Azores, and American aircraft
constantly trailed the boats for the rest of the voyage. To escape their shadowers
the Foxtrots were forced to dive to depths of over two hundred meters, out of
communications with each other or with Moscow.11
A fifth submarine, the long-range diesel boat B-75 (Zulu class/pr. 611) carry-
ing two nuclear torpedoes, was sent to the region at the end of September with
orders to defend Soviet transport ships if they came under attack. However, it
was recalled shortly after Kennedy announced the blockade. By 10 November,
the boat had returned to the USSR.12 The four Foxtrots never made it to Cuba.
Three returned to base after being forced to surface by U.S. Navy warships; the
last Foxtrot in the region (B-4) received orders to return to its home port of
Polyarnyi on 20 November.13
Although an utter embarrassment for Moscow, the Cuban Crisis taught the
Soviet Navy some important lessons with respect to long-range submarine op-
erations. The battery-cooling problem on diesel submarines was fixed in
fairly short order. More importantly, fresh emphasis was placed on the cre-
ation of a credible oceangoing fleet. Subsequent efforts increasingly focused on
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expanding operations beyond the Soviet littoral.14 The rapidly growing perma-
nent naval presence in the Mediterranean after 1964 was perhaps the most im-
portant consequence of this radical shift in Soviet naval policy.
THE OBSTACLE OF GEOGRAPHY
In clear contrast to the United Kingdom and the United States, Russia has always
been a continental power. The “tyranny of geography” has historically been the
greatest constraint on the deployment of Russian naval forces to distant waters;
Russia has 37,653 kilometers of coastline (45,169 kilometers in Soviet times),
the overwhelming majority of it in the arctic north.15
Russia was without a warm-water port until Catherine the Great annexed the
Crimean Peninsula from the Ottoman Empire in 1783, but the Turkish Straits—
consisting of the Bosporus and Dardanelles—still stood between Russia and the
Mediterranean. The great distances between Russia’s Black Sea, Baltic, North-
ern, and Pacific Fleets have also made it virtually impossible to achieve unity of
mass in crisis situations.16 Before and after the Second World War the Soviet na-
val mission focused primarily on coastal defense rather than forward
deployment.
A quick glance at a map immediately suggests that from the Russian perspec-
tive, the Mediterranean is not a convenient theater for naval operations. Access
to the sea is limited by three narrow choke points—the Gibraltar Strait, the
Turkish Straits, and the Suez Canal—each easy to monitor, guard, and, if neces-
sary, block. Moreover, the Mediterranean is, and always has been, a place of vital
strategic and economic interests for outside powers, especially the United King-
dom in the two centuries preceding World War II.
A Historical Prerogative
The Soviet justification for maintaining a permanent presence in the Mediterra-
nean was rooted as much in perceived historical entitlement as in national secu-
rity priorities. The Mediterranean and Black Seas were historically regarded by
many Russian elites as constituting a single body of water. As the preeminent
Black Sea power, then, the Soviet Union was compelled to extend its weight into
the adjoining waters. Such notions were reinforced by a rich history of Russian
naval operations in the Mediterranean. Admiral Ivan Kasatonov—commander
of the Black Sea Fleet in the early 1990s—recalls a conversation with a subma-
rine crew docked at Vlora, Albania, in 1959, during the Soviet Navy’s first ex-
tended deployment in the Mediterranean:
It seemed to me then, that the sailors understood the necessity of the presence of our
naval forces in the Mediterranean Sea.
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“Ships of the Russian Fleet have been here, on the Mediterranean Sea, since the times
of mommy Catherine [II, the Great]—said the senior torpedo crew member.—We
know how sailors under the command of Spiridov, Ushakov, Senyavin traversed and
fought here.”17
In a similar vein, Admiral Ivan Kapitanets, the Fifth Eskadra’s chief of staff
from 1970 to 1973, writes of the Mediterranean squadron’s development: “The
Russian fleet was again affirming itself in the Mediterranean Sea, as in centuries
past, making a stand for the interests of Russia.”18
The first-ever deployment of Russian naval forces to the eastern Mediterra-
nean took place during the 1768–74 Russo-Turkish War, when Catherine II sent
an expeditionary force of the Russian fleet from the Baltic to the Aegean and
eastern Mediterranean Seas to support the land campaign against Turkey. Al-
though outnumbered almost two to one, the Russian force achieved significant
successes in battles off Chios and Chesme, devastating virtually the entire Turk-
ish fleet; fifteen battleships, six frigates, and over forty smaller vessels were sunk
in a matter of hours.19
The Russian Navy kept a permanent Mediterranean presence for several
years, maintaining a blockade of the Dardanelles and exercising total sea control
in the major Aegean choke points. The 1774 Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji gave Russia
considerable territorial gains, as well as protectorship over the Ottoman Em-
pire’s Greek-Orthodox subjects. It also allowed Russian ships to navigate the
Black Sea and pass through the Turkish straits, although control of the straits
would remain a point of contention for some time.
The Montreux Restrictions
A century and a half and six Russo-Turkish wars later, the Montreux Conference
of 1936 turned control of the Dardanelles and Bosporus over to Turkey and
greatly restricted the movement of warships through them.20 Moscow was ini-
tially a supporter of the Montreux initiative—the conditions would protect the
Soviet Union from superior hostile fleets and greatly strengthen the potential
Soviet role in the Mediterranean, as long as Turkey remained friendly, or at least
neutral.21 However, Turkey signed a mutual assistance treaty with France and the
United Kingdom in 1939; after unsuccessful post–World War II Soviet attempts to
obtain greater control over the straits, the Soviet Union found that the Montreux
restrictions hindered its ambitions to become a Mediterranean naval power.
The provisions of the Montreux Convention most pertinent to the Soviets
were the following: light surface vessels (smaller than ten thousand tons and
with guns not exceeding 203 millimeters), minor war vessels, and naval auxil-
iaries could pass, with few restrictions; all warship transits had to be declared
to Turkish authorities eight days prior; and foreign warships could pass only in
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groups totaling fifteen thousand tons or less. Black Sea powers were granted
special privileges not permitted to other foreign powers: capital ships (surface
vessels of war, other than aircraft carriers, exceeding tonnage limits of light
surface vessels) and submarines (if en route to or from repair facilities) could
be sent singly through the straits. The above conditions could be suspended,
however, in the event of a war involving Turkey or if Turkey was otherwise un-
der threat; the Turkish government was permitted complete discretion in such
circumstances.22
The Soviets found ways to circumvent some of the treaty’s restrictions. They
skirted the eight-day waiting period on warships through the use of contingency
declarations, which allowed Black Sea Fleet ships to augment rapidly the stand-
ing force in the Mediterranean during crisis situations.23 For example, on 11 Oc-
tober 1973, during the Arab-Israeli conflict, a group of Soviet warships passed
through the straits to make a port visit to Italy, its declared destination. Subse-
quently, however, the ships joined the other Soviet naval forces in the region.24
On the foreign-policy front, the Soviets also effectively exploited tensions be-
tween Turkey and its NATO allies, particularly Greece and the United States. For
example, after Turkey dropped an alleged 340 kilograms of bombs and napalm
on Greek Cypriot strongholds in northwestern Cyrus in August 1964, the U.S.
president, Lyndon Johnson, and much of the international community publicly
condemned Turkish involvement in that local crisis. Ankara responded by relax-
ing restrictions on passage of Soviet ships through the straits; shortly afterward,
the Soviets moved a cruiser and two destroyers into the Mediterranean from the
Black Sea.25 Later, the Soviets further exploited Turkey’s easing of the regula-
tions, in response to U.S. support for Israel. This situation helped facilitate So-
viet operations during the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, specifically the airlift
and sealift to Egypt and Syria, and the rapid reinforcement of the Fifth Eskadra
by Black Sea Fleet forces.
THE BROADER CONTEXT
Although Moscow had initiated arms transfers to Egypt as early as 1955 (thereby
extending Soviet influence into a vacuum left by Britain) and had established a
brief naval presence in the Aegean Sea thanks to the use of Albanian ports in
1959, it was not until the American deployment of Polaris submarines in March
1963 that a forward naval presence in the Mediterranean became a central na-
tional security interest for Moscow.26
Polaris
On 14 April 1963, the USS Sam Houston (SSBN 609) visited the Turkish port of
Izmir, in the first Mediterranean patrol ever made by a ballistic missile
3 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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submarine. The submarine, armed with Polaris missiles, was capable of deliver-
ing an explosive yield greater than the combined bomb tonnage dropped in
World War II by Allied and Axis powers (including the bombs dropped on Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki).27 The missile’s range (2,800 kilometers for A-2 missiles,
four thousand for A-3), underwater launch capability, and mobility made Po-
laris a milestone in the Cold War nuclear deterrence calculus. A ballistic missile
fired from the eastern Mediterranean could thus potentially hit Moscow or Le-
ningrad.28 Such a threat was not entirely new to Moscow—the first Polaris sub-
marine, USS George Washington (SSBN 598), had completed three patrols off
Russia’s northern coastline by mid-1961.29 However, Polaris submarines patrol-
ling in those waters, home to the Northern Fleet, were considerably more vul-
nerable to Soviet ASW operations than were those in the Mediterranean. In light
of its strategic weakness in the new area of U.S. ballistic missile deployment, the
Kremlin prioritized the creation of a permanent counterforce in the Mediterra-
nean. In the words of a former British defense intelligence officer,
The initial response was first to establish a 1500 nm [nautical mile] ASW defence
zone . . . which covered the Norwegian Sea, Arctic and the Eastern [Mediterranean],
followed, in due [course] by a 2,500 nm zone, a radius of threat that took in Arabian
Sea (deployments started in 1967–68) and (not coincidentally) reflected the range of
successive Polaris systems.30
Moscow’s singular focus on the emerging U.S. SSBN threat reflected the dom-
inance of the Soviet ground forces in making overall strategy. It was likely these
elements that initiated the deployment of often unprotected surface forces to
serve as “forward observation posts,” providing continuous target data on the
location of U.S. and NATO nuclear strike forces.31
Soviet Support for Arab States
In its renewed quest for bases in the Mediterranean, Moscow turned to the Arab
states. Egypt’s aversion to European imperialism and to American support for
Israel made it especially susceptible. After economic difficulties in the early
1960s, and especially after the devastation wrought by the June 1967 Arab-
Israeli War, President Gamal Abdel Nasser had become increasingly open to So-
viet aid, receptive to the urgings of leftist political forces in his own country, and
permissive toward Soviet use of Egyptian ports, airfields, and shore support fa-
cilities.32 Egypt rapidly became Moscow’s principal client in the Mediterranean.
In general, Soviet wartime assistance to Egypt, as well as to Syria and other
Arab states, consisted of, variously: provision of military equipment and intelli-
gence prior to hostilities; delivery of supplies during the conflict; the demonstra-
tive use of military power in the vicinity of the war zone; transfer of military
advisers and specialists to the warring countries; and finally, engagement of Soviet
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personnel in combat operations. Moscow’s willingness to provide one or another
of these kinds of support in the Middle East and elsewhere in the third world had
remained fairly consistent during the entire Cold War period, but it intensified
in the 1970s, reflecting Moscow’s more robust power-projection capabilities.33
Détente
In the 1970s, Moscow’s commitment to its client states was supplemented by a
parallel interest in U.S.-Soviet concord. The growing presence of the Soviet
Navy in the Mediterranean lent much credence to Henry Kissinger’s argument
for détente—that is, since U.S. efforts to maintain regional hegemony would
only provoke greater countermeasures by the Soviets, the interests of both sides
would be better served by a policy of mutual restraint.34 The new policy of
détente began with the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (November 1969) and
was affirmed when President Richard Nixon and General Secretary Leonid
Brezhnev signed the “Basic Principles of Relations Between the U.S.A. and the
U.S.S.R.” in May 1972. This document—which outlined the principles of
détente—stipulated that bilateral relations were to be based on reciprocity, re-
straint, economic interdependence, and conflict mitigation. Further, it asserted
that efforts of one state to gain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other
would be inconsistent with such objectives.
The principles of détente, however, often proved incompatible with Mos-
cow’s foreign policy toward client states. Egypt, which had been able to exploit
Cold War rivalries to meet its own agenda—both in the domestic realm and in
its ambitions to reclaim territory occupied by Israel in 1967—now fretted that
détente would take precedence over Soviet support for Cairo and other Arab re-
gimes.35 Therein lay the dilemma for Moscow—such support risked direct su-
perpower confrontation, but failure to provide it risked the loss of local port
access, which was of tremendous strategic value to the Soviet Navy.
A NATO “LAKE”
The U.S. Sixth Fleet and NATO had long enjoyed such strategic advantages over
the Soviet Navy that the Mediterranean was described as a NATO “lake” during
the early phases of the Cold War. Most notably, NATO members controlled the
two primary choke points into the sea—the Gibraltar and Turkish straits.
U.S. Advantages
The Sixth Fleet benefited from an abundance of local naval bases and facilities—
among others Rota (Spain), La Maddalena (Italy), Naples (Italy), and Souda Bay,
Crete (Greece). Furthermore, due to well developed underway replenishment
techniques, the Sixth Fleet had generally been capable of operating for pro-
longed periods without shore access.
3 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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The Western alliance could draw on its carrier air wings in addition to NATO
air bases in Spain, Italy, Greece, and Turkey. Carrier-based aircraft were capable
of dropping conventional or nuclear ordnance and had a range of more than a
thousand miles, bringing Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and the southern USSR
well within reach.36 The deployment of even one extra carrier into the region (as
had occurred during the October 1973 war) added an additional ninety aircraft.
One notable disadvantage encountered by the U.S. Navy in the Mediterra-
nean, however, was the absence of a deep sound channel that could be exploited
by the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS), a network of seabed listening arrays
deployed to detect submarines from great distances.37 These arrays of
hydrophones spaced along undersea cables had been installed in the Bahamas,
along the U.S. Atlantic and Pacific coasts, and most significantly in the North At-
lantic.38 The lack of SOSUS capabilities in the Mediterranean was somewhat al-
leviated by the deployment of surface ships equipped with towed-array
surveillance systems.39
Soviet Disadvantages
The principal constraints on Soviet Mediterranean operations, aside from the
Montreux Treaty, included periodic restrictions on shore access, burdensome
deployment distances, and air inferiority. Such factors made the exploits the So-
viet Navy was able to achieve in the Mediterranean all the more remarkable.
Bases and Anchorages. The Soviets had never had permanent bases in the Medi-
terranean, and their access to local port facilities had always been tightly regu-
lated by often-erratic host governments. The brief, limited use of Albanian port
facilities ended in the Soviet Navy’s expulsion and confiscation of its military
equipment by Tirana in 1961. Moscow’s subsequent Arab hosts were no more
reliable. Captain First Rank Yevgenii Semenov, chief of staff of the Fifth Eskadra
on the eve of the October War, recalls an occasion when two Black Sea Fleet sub-
marines, having waited for two days to enter Annaba, Algeria, were finally, on 13
June 1973, forced to leave.40 In such an unpredictable atmosphere, the Fifth
Eskadra was compelled to diversify its points of contact along the Mediterra-
nean littoral, maintain a standing force of auxiliary vessels to reduce dependence
on local bases, limit on-station times, and request augmentation of Black Sea
Fleet elements by Northern and Baltic Fleet forces.41
As mentioned above, the USSR, as a relative newcomer to the region, bene-
fited from anti-imperialist sentiments endemic in the Arab world.42 The Soviets
were thus reluctant to undercut their propaganda by establishing permanent
bases of their own in Arab lands. Instead, they relied on twelve offshore anchor-
ages, which generally included floating dry docks and repair facilities.43 Most of
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these anchorages were in international waters; the main ones were located off
the Greek island of Kithira and in the Gulf of Sidra, near the north-central coast
of Libya. Relatively underdeveloped underway replenishment techniques forced
Soviet vessels to detach periodically from their operating stations and return to
these anchorages to refuel.44
Despite the inherent drawbacks, however, these anchorages lent the Soviet
forces a “mobile character,” facilitating regular active combat training. They also
simplified resupply duties, though only limited repairs were possible.45
Deployment Distances. The Montreux restrictions on submarine transits meant
that submarines could be deployed to the region almost exclusively from the
Northern and Baltic Fleets, through the Strait of Gibraltar. A former Soviet sub-
marine officer recalls one method of passing through this NATO choke point:
Every ship had a special method for a forced crossing underwater. The diving depths,
speeds, . . . and the course were all predetermined. . . . A submarine, having come
abeam the Sao Vicente cape, went south, confirming its location via the depth of the
sea. Coming up to Cape Spartel (Morocco), the sub came up to periscope depth, and
in literally one or two minutes used its radio-location system to determine the dis-
tance to the shore, while the navigator took a visual bearing through the periscope on
a Spartel lighthouse. . . . After determining the location, the submarine crossed the
strait at a high speed, . . . since strong currents could impede a slow crossing. After
one of the Soviet boats hit the bottom near the banks of Phoenix, we were required
to cross the strait with the fathometer on, so as to have constant control over the
depth under the keel. We understood that this compromised stealth, although it was
understood that in peacetime safety was more important.46
Sending submarines from the remote northern Soviet fleets both limited the
strength of the local undersea force and slowed deployment or reinforcement in
crisis situations.47 Part of the Soviet solution was to extend the ships’ stays in
the region.
After 1967, access to Egyptian ports extended the time diesel submarines
could remain in the Mediterranean from two months to six.48 Facilities in Alex-
andria were set up to repair diesel submarines (a floating dry dock was towed to
Tartus, Syria, for the same purpose). Port Said was the most heavily used of the
Egyptian ports. Groups of two to three ships docked there (to curb Israeli ambi-
tions in the Suez region) for two or three-month shifts, always in a high state of
operational readiness.49 Nonetheless, submarines were relieved much more fre-
quently than were surface ships—if not due to the condition of the submarines
then for the sake of the worn-out crews. By 1973, however, Northern Fleet SSGNs
(nuclear-powered cruise-missile submarines) were being deployed to the Medi-
terranean for up to thirteen months at a time. The only permanent deployments
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in the Mediterranean were of the eskadra’s commander and staff, embarked on
one or another of the larger cruisers.50
Air Cover. Soviet Air Force flights into the Mediterranean were effectively
blocked by NATO air defenses in Turkey and Greece.51 Even in the period of
short-lived access to Egyptian airfields at Aswan and Cairo-West—used by the
Soviets to deter Israeli advances during the War of Attrition (1967–70) and to fly
reconnaissance missions against the Sixth Fleet—the prospect of achieving air
superiority was virtually nonexistent.
After 1967, the Mediterranean became the first theater for Soviet sea-based
aviation, on a limited basis. Considerable investment was initiated after the 1963
deployment of Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean to put the USSR on the
same footing as the West in antisubmarine warfare. The cruiser Moskva (pr. 1123)
was the first large ship to emerge from the program, and it drew much attention
from the United States upon its deployment to the Mediterranean in 1967.
Although its design was unambiguously that of a helicopter carrier, the Soviets
designated it a “large antisubmarine ship,” thereby evading the capital-ship clause
of the Montreux Convention and enabling it to deploy from the Black Sea.52
This experiment in naval aviation, however innovative, was never intended to
offset U.S. air superiority. The Ka-25 helicopter, of which the Moskva and its sis-
ter ship Leningrad could accommodate a maximum of eighteen each, was slower
and of shorter range and endurance than its U.S. counterparts, and an easy tar-
get for NATO fighters. One
hypothesis is that the Moskva
had been originally designed
to extend the r ange of
shore-based ASW helicopters
engaged in anti-Polaris opera-
tions in the Barents Sea. In the
Mediterranean, however, with-
out proper support facilities,
the ship proved ineffective, “far
too small and vulnerable for
operating . . . on the far side of
the Straits.”53 The many defi-
ciencies in the Moskva’s de-
sign—ranging from inadequate length and poor seakeeping characteristics in
rough weather to an aircraft complement too small for its intended ASW pur-
pose—accelerated the ship’s replacement by the first full-size Soviet carrier, the
Kiev (pr. 1143), which first operated in the Mediterranean in 1976.54
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THE FIFTH ESKADRA, 1967–1973
The Fifth Eskadra’s first Deputy Chief for the Southern Theater of Operations,
Captain First Rank Georgii G. Kostev, notes that the Mediterranean squadron
was “perhaps the most unusual formation of the Soviet Navy in the postwar pe-
riod.”55 According to Kostev, it was created in 1967 to counter the United States
in an area of vital American interests, specifically in response to an upsurge in
U.S. and NATO maritime activity in the region after the June 1967 Arab-Israeli
War.56 The core elements of the squadron’s mission were surveillance of the
Sixth Fleet in the areas of its activity, constant shadowing of U.S. carriers, detec-
tion of American ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) deployments, assessment
of the threat posed to the continental USSR by American SSBNs, and the disrup-
tion of U.S. sea control.57
Because of the operational organization of the opposing Sixth Fleet and the
sheer size of the operating area, the Mediterranean Theater of Military Opera-
tions (TVD) was divided into three zones—Eastern, Central, and Western. To
serve the tactical objectives of the squadron, six task forces (OSs) were created
within it. OS-50 consisted of the flagship and its escort vessels; it had no fixed
operating area. OS-51 comprised submarines (an average daily strength of six to
eight units) pursuing U.S. SSBNs, usually in the Western and Central zones.
OS-52 was made up of surface ships armed with surface-to-surface missiles
(SSMs) tailing U.S. carriers from the points of entry to the Central and Eastern
zones. OS-53 contained antisubmarine vessels, such as the Moskva, operating in
the Western and Central zones with the support of aircraft and submarines.
OS-54 was an amphibious task force, consisting of two or three landing ships
and an escort ship, generally based in Port Said. OS-55 consisted of auxiliary ves-
sels, tankers, floating repair facilities, and other support ships.58
THE LIBYAN COUP D’ETAT, 1969
An episode in September 1969 offers a telling example of the Fifth Eskadra’s ex-
panding capabilities. Increased access to local port facilities after the 1967
Arab-Israeli War afforded the Soviets the option of conducting extensive exer-
cises at sea, using a greater number and variety of forces than ever before. One
set of such exercises, begun in mid-August 1969, saw the number of Soviet war-
ships in the Mediterranean swell to over seventy;59 this figure included
twenty-seven surface combatants at the exercises’ peak.60 During the coup of 1
September of that year in the Libyan capital, Tripoli, in which King Idris’s gov-
ernment was ousted by a group of young officers led by Muamar Qaddafi, the
heavy local presence of Soviet warships may well have been a crucial, if serendip-
itous, deterrent to U.S. and British intervention.
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Although on the eve of the coup Washington did not see the existence of
Wheelus Air Base, just east of Tripoli, as creating a de facto commitment, to the
Libyan state—the United States, unlike the United Kingdom, had no defense
pact with the Libyan monarchy—a British intervention was a serious possibility.61
King Idris indeed appealed for U.S. and British assistance during the crisis, but any
commitments notwithstanding, no Anglo-American intervention took place.62
Semenov recalls that in July 1969 the SSM-equipped cruiser Groznyi (Kynda
class/pr. 58) and the surface-to-air missile (SAM) destroyer Bedovyi (Kildin
class/pr. 56E) left Sevastopol for a port visit to Cuba. In early August the group
was returning to the Mediterranean with the tanker Lena. Meanwhile, several
groups of Black Sea Fleet ships from Sevastopol had entered the Mediterranean:
the Moskva, the SAM light cruiser Dzerzhinskii (Sverdlov class/pr. 70E), four
large submarine chasers, four destroyers, three escort vessels, three large am-
phibious ships, and three medium amphibious ships with naval infantry
onboard.63
On 13 August the Dzerzhinskii, flying the flag of Admiral V. S. Sysoev, led the
SAM destroyers Reshitel’nyi (Kashin class/pr. 61) and Nakhodchivyi (Kotlin
class/pr. 56) out of Varna, Bulgaria, where they had helped commemorate Bul-
garian Navy Day. The group proceeded into the Mediterranean to participate in
a training exercise code-named BRONYA.64
In early September, a series of Soviet-Egyptian-Syrian naval exercises com-
menced, involving an amphibious landing on the Egyptian coast twenty miles
southwest of Alexandria. During the mock assault over a hundred warships
from the three states formed a 210-mile protective screen from the Gulf of
Sollum (seventy miles east of British tank bases at Tobruk and Al Adem) to east-
ern Crete.65 By the end of the month, over forty Soviet vessels had concentrated
in the extreme southern part of the Ionian Sea off the coast of Libya; they in-
cluded the group that had returned from the Caribbean.66 Many of the units out-
side the screen were concentrated between Sicily and Tripoli.
The British bases at Tobruk (which was also the site of an airfield) and Al
Adem were of most concern to the Libyan coup plotters, since the British kept
the tanks in a state of operational readiness, needing only to fly in crews from
Cyprus. It is plausible that the need to overfly Soviet SAM-equipped ships to
reach Tobruk made any decisive move against Qaddafi’s men unattractive to
Britain. London announced on 5 September—after the old regime had col-
lapsed—that the United Kingdom had no intention of intervening.67
American freedom of action may also have been affected by the Soviet pres-
ence. After 1 September, Semenov asserts, the USS John F. Kennedy (CVA 67) car-
rier battle group left port at Cannes and began a passage through the Tyrrhenian
Sea at high speed to the Straits of Messina. The Sixth Fleet flagship, the cruiser
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USS Little Rock (CLG 4), and its escorts departed from the Italian port of Gaeta
around the same time and on 5 September entered the Ionian Sea on a course
to Tripoli.68
The U.S. carrier groups were met by four cruisers (Moskva, Dzerzhinskii,
Groznyi, the gun-armed light cruiser Mikhail Kutuzov [Sverdlov class/pr. 68-A]),
three SAM destroyers (Bravyi [converted Kotlin class], Bedovyi, Boikii [Krupnyi
class/pr. 57bis]), three SAM destroyers (Reshitel’nyi, Soobrazitel’nyi, and Krasnyi
Kavkaz [all Kashin class]), four gun destroyers (Nakhodchivyi, Blagorodnyi
[both Kotlin class], Sereznyi, and Sovershennyi [both Skoryi class/pr. 30bis]), six
escort vessels, six SSGs (conventionally powered cruise-missile submarines of
the Juliett class/pr. 651), and
one SSN (nuclear-powered at-
tack submarine of the Novem-
ber class/pr. 627A). To the east
of these forces was the am-
phibious force, which now in-
cluded two large amphibious
ships, five medium amphibi-
ous ships with naval infantry
and their equipment on board,
minesweepers, and support
vessels.69 According to a Center
for Naval Analyses study, “The
exercise schedule thus put the
Soviets into a good position to
counter . . . the Sixth Fleet com-
ing from the west.”70
This is not to suggest that the Soviets planned the exercises to coincide with
the coup; the contrary is generally believed to have been the case. However, the
episode revealed much about the developing operations of the Fifth Eskadra. In
this case, the force may have effectively, though perhaps inadvertently, neutral-
ized British and American options for intervention.71
THE JORDANIAN CRISIS, 1970
An equally significant, if less impressive, Soviet show of force occurred at the
time of the 1970 Jordanian crisis. On 9 September 1970, after members of the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine flew two hijacked commercial air-
craft to a dirt runway near Amman, Jordan, President Richard Nixon ordered
the USS Independence (CVA 62) carrier task group to a position off Lebanon, to
await further instructions. Meanwhile, as the Kremlin urged the White House to
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exercise caution, Fifth Eskadra warships positioned themselves among the U.S.
carrier task forces as well as between the American ships and the coast.72
On 17 September, Jordan’s King Hussein ordered his army to move against
Palestinian terrorist camps throughout the country. Two more U.S. carrier
groups were then ordered to the region to support the Jordanian army—USS
Saratoga (CVA 60) headed east from Malta, and the John F. Kennedy set sail
across the Atlantic—while the Sixth Fleet’s amphibious element, Task Force 61
(consisting of a helicopter carrier and landing ships), left Crete for the Lebanese
littoral.73
Disregarding a direct warning from Nixon against such an action, Syria began
moving forces into Jordan on 20 September in support of the Palestinians. As
preparations for U.S. intervention appeared to be under way, the Soviets took a
more aggressive approach to naval diplomacy. The Fifth Eskadra, increased from
forty-seven to sixty ships, took up battle positions and ran missiles onto
launcher rails in plain view of U.S. forces;74 its fire-control radars began tracking
American aircraft.75 At one point, seven SSM-equipped Soviet ships were within
striking range of the U.S. carriers.76 In response, Sixth Fleet escorts armed with
rapid-fire guns were given orders to trail the Soviet ships so as to, if need be, de-
stroy most of the cruise missiles before they could be launched.77 Fortunately,
developments on the ground obviated the need for superpower intervention; in
two days’ time, the Syrians lost 120 tanks to Jordanian artillery and to mechani-
cal malfunction and were forced to withdraw.78
The ability of the Fifth Eskadra to maintain a deterrent capability during the
Jordanian crisis was relatively modest, however, compared to the October 1973
Arab-Israeli War. There were several debilitating factors at play, from the
Kremlin’s point of view. The crisis coincided with the death, on 20 September, of
Nasser, Moscow’s main patron in the region. Although Egyptian-Soviet rela-
tions remained essentially unaffected at first, this event introduced a degree of
uncertainty concerning the effect Soviet action could have on the region.79 Fur-
thermore, the Soviets were undoubtedly shocked at the rapid losses of Soviet-
supplied tanks and at the failure of the Syrian army (trained by Soviet advisers)
to mount a substantial challenge to Jordanian forces. Under such conditions, it is
likely that Moscow simply preferred a quick, clean end to the conflict, without
superpower entanglement.
Washington, for its part, had its own reasons for shock. U.S. forces had proved,
in the later recollection of the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt,
“so far from [formidable] that the [Joint] Chiefs [of Staff (JCS)] and [Deputy]
Secretary [of Defense David] Packard expressed repeated concern about the in-
adequacy of U.S. naval capability in the Eastern Mediterranean.”80 The chairman
of the JCS, Admiral Thomas Moorer, had reported on 9 September that in their
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current state of readiness, U.S. forces would have very little staying power in the
Middle East. He argued that in view of the difficulty of reinforcing from South-
east Asia, where most American forces were then concentrated, “the United
States should make every effort not to become involved in large-scale military
action.”81 The Jordanian crisis thus afforded Moscow a key lesson—that the U.S.
military was stretched thin in the Middle East.
EXERCISES BEFORE THE YOM KIPPUR WAR
The Fifth Eskadra’s activities before the October 1973 war centered largely on re-
connaissance, intelligence gathering, and antiaircraft warfare (AAW) exercises.
Because of their lack of carrier aviation and nearby airfields, the Soviets stood at
a critical disadvantage with regard to air operations in the Mediterranean. With
the expulsion of Soviet Air Force personnel from Egypt in July 1972 (a result of a
row over Soviet foot-dragging on arms deliveries—an upshot of détente), the
Fifth Eskadra lost much of its reconnaissance capability in the Mediterranean.
Largely due to unrivaled U.S. air superiority in the region, first-strike was
given special importance in the 1973 exercises, reflecting the Soviet “battle of the
first salvo” doctrine. In his 8 January 1973 journal entry, Semenov writes of an
officers’ briefing on anticarrier warfare: “Ship attack groups need to use all
weaponry for assaults on aerial attack groups: missiles, artillery, torpedoes,
jet-propelled rockets—the whole lot![—] since it is unlikely that anything will
remain afloat after an air strike. We are kamikazes.”82 A retired Soviet submarine
officer recalls the doctrine in similar terms: “Of course, it was assumed that we
would be fighting for the ‘first salvo.’ This was very important, to be the first to
deliver the blow, before the other side could send its aviation into the air. It’s dif-
ficult for me to judge whether we could have delivered the first blow or not, but
we were ready for it.”83
Semenov recalls debates on 26 February 1973 concerning antiaircraft and
anticarrier tactics, especially over methods of surveillance by various ship-
attack groups (surface ships and submarines) and the organization of strikes on
U.S. forces. The eskadra was actively exploring ways to adapt to the Sixth Fleet’s
tendency to use island regions, extend detachments out as far as fifteen miles,
and constantly shift the composition of its contingents.84
Problems with relaying intelligence to Soviet cruise missile–carrying and other
submarines were also of great concern, largely prompted by embarrassing epi-
sodes on 11 January in which U.S. ships forced a Soviet diesel submarine south
of Crete to the surface and aggressively pursued another in the Gulf of Sidra. Ac-
cording to Semenov, in both instances the crews had followed the General Staff ’s
commands precisely but in the end had cruised straight into the “mouth of the en-
emy.”85 Other problems with communications had similarly embarrassing results;
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discrepancies in the fleet’s surveillance and intelligence communications fre-
quently led to “blind” sorties. Semenov recalled that two medium-sized vessels
had recently been sent to the Spanish coast for no apparent reason.86
There were also significant tensions between Fifth Eskadra officers and the
Black Sea Fleet command in Sevastopol. Fifth Eskadra commander Admiral
Yevgenii Volobuyev was for some time unsure how to address a perceived short-
age of ships in the Mediterranean. To appeal to Sevastopol for more would likely
have led to a confrontation, since Black Sea Fleet commanders did not appreci-
ate being corrected by subordinates.87 Moscow’s insistence on the use of diesel
submarines was also a point of dispute; Fifth Eskadra commanders found them
ineffective in areas where the enemy had control of the air.88 The Sixth Fleet had
proven highly proficient at spotting Soviet submarines, and the need of diesel
boats to surface at regular intervals to recharge batteries made stealth difficult.
Nevertheless, naval headquarters did not entertain assertions that the diesel sub-
marines were obsolete and stood firm on the boats’ continued utility.89
Fifth Eskadra surveillance activities in this period were highly focused, as
they would be during the war, on U.S. carrier task groups. Soviet destroyers
shadowed the USS Forrestal (CVA 59) in mid-January 1973 in the area of
Thessaloniki, Greece.90 Fifth Eskadra warships conducted surveillance, and
analysis of extensive NATO exercises (involving the United States, the United
Kingdom, France, Italy, and Turkey) that took place across the Mediterranean
on 21 February.91 Semenov asserts that helicopters launched from the Moskva,
with assistance from the ASW cruiser Nikolayev (Kara class/pr. 1134B) and the
destroyer Komsomolets Ukrainy (Kashin class), surveilled and pursued Ameri-
can SSBNs in the Tyrrhenian Sea on 5–6 April.92 A massive search operation for
U.S. forces was launched in the eastern Mediterranean on 9 May during clashes
between Lebanese forces and Palestinian guerillas. The operation involved sev-
eral cruisers, destroyers, large and medium amphibious ships, minesweepers,
monitors, gunboats, and other ships; it stopped when the Soviets became con-
vinced that the Sixth Fleet was not planning to intervene ashore.93 According to
Semenov, Operation NAKAT, also launched on 9 May, involved surveillance of
U.S. ballistic missile–carrying submarines from their departure from their base
at Rota, Spain.94 Sea-based helicopters undertook another intensive ASW opera-
tion on 14 May, searching for the USS George Marshall (SSBN 654) in the area of
Sicily.95 The carrier Independence was also shadowed by a Fifth Eskadra battle
group starting on 29 June, when it left Cadiz.96
WAR
Egypt’s decision to go to war with Israel was made by President Anwar Sadat and his
Syrian counterpart Hafez al-Assad in the summer of 1973. The planned date of
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attack was kept from the Kremlin until 4 October, two days before the outbreak of
hostilities.97 On that day Leonid Brezhnev sent a message to Sadat stating that the
decision to fight must be the Arabs’ alone, although Egypt could rely on Soviet sup-
port. Brezhnev’s only request was that Soviet civilians be allowed to evacuate.98
At this time, the Fifth Eskadra consisted of fifty-two ships, including eleven
submarines (at least two of them equipped with nuclear-tipped cruise missiles),
three cruisers (two with guided missiles), six guided-missile and conventional
destroyers, five frigates, two minesweepers, and two amphibious ships.99 The
flagship Volga (an Ugra-class submarine tender, project 1886) was in the vicinity
of the Balearic Islands east of Spain, when Admiral Volobuyev learned of the im-
minence of war. Around 0100 (1 AM local time) on 4 October, he ordered a mass
redeployment to the Egyptian and Syrian coasts to evacuate Soviet families from
the war zone to a point south of Crete, where they would be transferred to trans-
port vessels. Although efficient, the evacuation effort was somewhat draining
for the Fifth Eskadra; its captains were eager to be relieved of their passengers so
as to concentrate on raising their level of battle readiness.100
Other Soviet combatants were redirected to the war zone. A former subma-
rine officer recalls the revision of his ship’s orders:
In October 1973, when we were already preparing to leave our area of operations . . .
in the Ionian Sea, we received a radio transmission, saying that the sub, in connec-
tion with the deteriorating situation in the Middle East, must extend its tour of duty
in the Mediterranean by ten days. After this, our boat was redirected east, near the
coast of Egypt. Of course, we were very disappointed, and no one hid this. To us,
these “unplanned” ten days would last longer than all other active duty combined.
However, no one lost their heart. We were all young.101
On the following day, 5 October, a guided missile destroyer, four submarines,
and an auxiliary ship arrived in the Mediterranean, seemingly to relieve previ-
ously deployed Soviet forces. However, no detachment occurred; the six ships
thus augmented the size of the Fifth Eskadra to fifty-eight vessels.102
Phase 1
The first phase of the Yom Kippur War—spanning from the outbreak of hostili-
ties on 6 October to the beginning of the U.S. airlift to Israel on 13 October—
saw relatively little tension between the Sixth Fleet and the Fifth Eskadra.
Despite their augmented numbers, Soviet forces mostly continued normal
peacetime operations.103 Liberty ashore was canceled for the Sixth Fleet, but the U.S.
Navy announced that no American ships had been ordered to the conflict area.104
On 6 October, there were forty-eight U.S. warships in the Mediterranean. The
force consisted of its flagship USS Mount Whitney (LCC 20), at sea south of
Crete, four SSNs on patrol in the Mediterranean, and Task Forces (TFs) 60 and
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61.105 Task Group (TG) 60.1 consisted of the Independence and its group, then in
Athens; the USS Franklin D. Roosevelt (CVA 42) group, then in various Spanish
ports, made up TG 60.2. TF 61, the amphibious force, at this point included the
helicopter carrier USS Guadalcanal (LPH 7) and nine other amphibious ships,
carrying a Marine battalion landing team (about three thousand men).106
The Fifth Eskadra then included eleven submarines, one SSM cruiser (Kynda
class/pr. 58), one gun cruiser (Sverdlov class), five SAM destroyers (three Kashin
class and two converted Kotlin class), two gun destroyers (Kotlin class), nine frigates
and corvettes (Petya class/pr. 159, Mirka class/pr. 35, and Riga class/pr. 50), two
medium landing ships (Polnocny B class/pr. 771), two minesweepers, and several
auxiliary vessels. Altogether, the Soviet forces were then capable of launching
twenty SSMs in their first salvo.107
The staff aboard the flagship Volga was already on edge. Many of its officers were
standing watches “port and starboard”—even the chief of staff, Aleksandr Ushakov,
who was relieved by Semenov at night. Semenov’s diary notes that the life of the staff
became one of “wild, frantic work! Aleksandr Petrovich Ushakov turned out to be a
very emotional person, like the commander [Volobuyev]. They go berserk in con-
cert. What’s good for the ship (emotion), is not what suits the staff. . . . The mind of a
staff officer works better under calm circumstances.”108
Although the October war has been typically characterized as one initiated by
a surprise attack by Egypt and Syria, Semenov contends that the element of sur-
prise was in fact lacking. According to his account, Israeli forces in the Suez
Canal area were placed on alert as early as 1 October, and a partial Israeli mobili-
zation began on 4 October.109 Full mobilization of Israeli forces took place at
1000 (10 AM) on 6 October in anticipation of imminent attack.110 Semenov
argues that this apparent Israeli foreknowledge forced the Arabs to launch their
attack earlier than intended.111 Egyptian and Syrian forces began their respective
advances over the Suez Canal and into the Golan Heights at 1430 (2:30 PM), after
bombarding Israeli airfields and communications facilities.112 The Independence
group left Athens the following day for an area south of Crete, trailed by a Soviet
destroyer.113
By 8 October Egyptian forces had captured two beachheads eight to ten kilo-
meters deep on the east bank of the Suez Canal; the Syrians halted their advance
after moving seven to ten kilometers forward on the Golan Heights.114 Subse-
quently, Israel counterattacked on both fronts. Meanwhile, Independence joined
Mount Whitney south of Crete, while TF 61 was ordered to Souda Bay (on the
northern coast of Crete), where it would remain at anchor until 25 October.115
On 9 October, thanks to extended deployments, the Fifth Eskadra’s subma-
rine force numbered sixteen boats, including at least four SSNs (probably No-
vember class).116 By this date, the evacuation effort was all but complete.117 On 10
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October, the Soviet surface combatant force strength in the region was
twenty-one ships, including three cruisers and nine destroyers, many equipped
with missiles, and two amphibious ships. The combatants were positioning
themselves near Sixth Fleet ships in the eastern Mediterranean, where the Soviet
Navy was already well on its way to achieving effective sea denial.118
Moscow began sending equipment and supplies to Syria and Egypt on 9 Oc-
tober.119 Soviet and Eastern European merchant ships and Soviet amphibious
ships conducted the sealift, while the airlift—Turkey having granted Moscow
permission to overfly its territory for resupply, in protest against U.S. support
for Israel—was taken on by Soviet military transports and civilian aircraft.120
The transports were loaded in Black Sea ports with up to ninety tanks each, as
well as armored vehicles, and other heavy equipment. The need to guard these
transports accounted for much of the Soviet naval buildup in the Mediterra-
nean. For that mission a special group of up to ten destroyers was formed, under
Captain First Rank N. Ya. Yasakov
(commander of the 70th Warship
Brigade in the Black Sea Fleet). The
magnitude of the escort forces was
dictated by reports of recent attacks
on Syrian ports by Israeli jets and
missile boats.121
As resupply efforts began, the
flagship Volga, the SSM cruiser
Groznyi, and the SAM destroyers
Krasnyi Kavkaz, Provornyi, and
Skoryi (all Kashin class) began tail-
ing the U.S. carrier groups south of
Crete.122 In response, three more es-
cort ships joined the Independence
carrier task group.123 Almost simul-
taneously, Soviet intelligence collec-
tion ships (AGIs) began monitoring
the U.S. amphibious task group at
Souda Bay, remaining there until the
25th.124 In effect, Moscow was send-
ing Washington a signal that inter-
ference with its resupply operations
would be met with force.
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October 1973
6th
Egypt and Syria launch offensives in Sinai Peninsula and
Golan Heights, respectively. The Yom Kippur War begins.
8th
Egyptian forces capture two beachheads on east bank of
Suez Canal. Syrian forces halt advance after having moved
10 km into Golan Heights. Israel counterattacks on both
fronts.
9th Soviet Union resupply effort to Egypt and Syria begins.
10th
Israel drives Syrian forces from Golan Heights but suffers
defeat in Sinai.
11th
Israeli missile boats sink Soviet merchant vessel Ilya
Mechnikov during raid on Syrian port of Tartus. Moscow
responds by deploying pair of destroyers off Syrian coast.
13th U.S. airlift to Israel begins.
17th Israeli armored units cross Suez Canal.
22d
United Nations Security Council Resolution 388 passes,
stipulating end to hostilities within 12 hours. Commander
of encircled Egyptian 3d Army disobeys cease-fire and
tries to break free. Israel advances on Suez City.
24th
Brezhnev sends direct message to Nixon, threatening uni-
lateral intervention to enforce cease-fire. Washington
moves to DefCon 3.
25th
Israel halts advance on Egyptian front, putting an end to
ground hostilities.
26th
Soviet Union launches intense anticarrier exercises against
Sixth Fleet carrier and amphibious task groups.
30th




Sixth Fleet taken off alert and returns to “normal training
condition” status.
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At this time, and until the very end of the episode, the American task groups
were especially vulnerable to Soviet cruise-missile attack because Washington
had denied them freedom of maneuver. The carriers were to stay in a defined
area south of Crete, in order to signal U.S. concern and interdict a potential air-
lift of Soviet troops to Egypt. However, this strategy backfired to some extent, by
greatly simplifying the targeting problem for the Fifth Eskadra.125 “So far we’ve
been in luck—good weather . . . and the Americans are maneuvering in one re-
gion at slow speeds,” writes Semenov in one journal entry.126
Volobuyev very much wanted to keep the Sixth Fleet uneasy as the two forces
became more tightly coupled. One of his methods was to convey an exaggerated
impression of the Soviet submarine threat to the carriers. Semenov recalls an in-
teresting ruse: “[U.S.] Airplanes and helicopters are flying nonstop, looking for
our subs. We dropped a grenade, as if for communication with our sub, and
again the intensity of the flights rose.”127 “Let them be nervous,” said
Volobuyev.128
The Soviet submarine forces were, in part, actually deployed as follows. An
Echo II SSGN (pr. 675) and a Juliett SSG were maneuvering west and south of
the Sixth Fleet task groups near Crete, while a November SSN was to the east.
More Soviet submarines were being sent to the region from the Atlantic and the
western Mediterranean.129 One Soviet submarine officer aboard a Charlie-class
SSGN (pr. 670) in the October crisis, recalls:
During the events of 1973, our submarine carried out its service for some time in the
vicinity of the Sidra Gulf, by the Libyan coast. Here, a group of U.S. Navy antisubma-
rine ships, evidently acting on some intelligence, or maybe simply presuming that
there might be a Soviet submarine about, was vigorously carrying out a search opera-
tion for two days. However, we gathered the impression that the ships achieved no
success. Nothing suggested that our boat had been discovered, even though we were
thoroughly listening to their hydroacoustic transmissions and sometimes the hum of
the ships’ propellers.130
On 10 October, the Fifth Eskadra’s surface force was also augmented by a
Black Sea Fleet group consisting of the gun cruiser Admiral Ushakov (Sverdlov
class), flying the flag of Rear Admiral L. Ya. Basyukov, and the SAM destroyers
Soznatelny (Kotlin) and Otvazhnyi (Kashin).131
The following day, the Fifth Eskadra was drawn more directly into the con-
flict. During an attack on the Syrian port of Tartus on the night of 11 October, Is-
rael inadvertently sank the Soviet merchant ship Ilya Mechnikov, which had
arrived before the resupply operations began.132 Israeli officials expressed regret,
explaining that the merchant ship had not been the intended target, but rather
two Syrian naval craft, which had been sunk as well. A similar incident had
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happened the previous day at the Syrian port of Latakia, where Israeli antiship
missiles sank a Japanese and a Greek freighter during a strike against Syrian mis-
sile ships maneuvering among civilian vessels.133 Nevertheless, Moscow was re-
luctant to accept the Israeli apology. The Soviet ambassador to Washington,
Anatolii Dobrynin, delivered a message from the Kremlin protesting the attack,
as well as recent deployments of U.S. ships to the eastern Mediterranean. The lat-
ter complaint was likely a reference to the John F. Kennedy task group, which had
been ordered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 11 October to leave Scotland, and
which, as Henry Kissinger had hinted to the Israeli ambassador on the 12th,
would shortly arrive in the Mediterranean.134
For its part, on 11 October Moscow placed three Soviet airborne divisions on
alert.135 Two days later it also stationed a destroyer off the Syrian coast to guard
supply transports.136 By that time Israel had halted its counteroffensive on the
Syrian front and had consolidated defensive positions.137 On 14 October, the So-
viet Navy authorized captains of individual warships in the Mediterranean to
open fire as necessary on Israeli and other planes and naval combatants should
they threaten Soviet convoys and transports.138
Phase 2
The second phase of the conflict—which was to end with the cessation of major
ground hostilities on 25 October—began on 13 October, when the U.S. Military
Airlift Command initiated the delivery of high-priority munitions to Israel.139
The resupply mission was not an easy one; virtually all NATO nations had re-
fused to allow the jets to refuel at their bases, with the exception of Portugal,
which permitted the United States to use the Azores.140 The Sixth Fleet was or-
dered to support the C-5 and C-141 transports flying to Israel with navigation,
surveillance, air defense, and search and rescue. The carrier groups south of
Crete lost many of their escorts to that effort, leaving them even more vulnerable
to Soviet antiship missiles.141 The John F. Kennedy group’s passage into the Medi-
terranean was also delayed; the carrier was sent instead to a point west of Gibral-
tar to support the airlift.142 At the same time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered the
helicopter carrier Iwo Jima (LPH 2), carrying a two-thousand-man battalion
landing team, to deploy to the Mediterranean.143 This last decision was a precau-
tion against a potential Soviet troop landing, which the growing Fifth Eskadra
force—sixty-nine ships as of 14 October—seemed increasingly capable of sup-
porting. Soviet submarines deployed to the Atlantic were ordered to the vicinity
of the Gibraltar Strait to await the U.S. reinforcements.144
On 15 October, Israel launched a full-scale counterattack in the Sinai, having
on the previous day crushed an Egyptian offensive aimed at relieving Israeli
pressure on Syria.145 Meanwhile, Soviet involvement in the crisis had begun to
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intensify, as a second destroyer was deployed just off the Syrian coast and Soviet
submarines began to monitor activities near Israeli ports.146
There were several recorded instances in which Soviet surface ships engaged
in limited combat operations against Israeli forces. In one such case, the Black
Sea Fleet minesweeper Rulevoi (Natya class/pr. 266), under Senior Lieutenant
P. Kozitsyn, and the medium landing ship SDK-137 (Polnocny B class/pr. 771),
under Lieutenant Captain L. Lisitsyn, guarding Soviet civilian transport ships at
Latakia, fired upon approaching Israeli jets on 16 October.147
While the Israeli jets had certainly been fired upon in self-defense, Soviet
commanders were undoubtedly aware of the risks involved. The restraint with
which Soviets traditionally approached direct involvement in local conflicts in
the détente era seems to have been at least partially suspended.148 The root of the
danger was that the tactical situation on the ground and at sea was beyond the
control of the superpowers—the Soviets were responding to threats to their own
ships posed by warring third parties, not by American forces. The imperative to
avoid conflict with the United States, however keenly appreciated by Soviet
strategists, may have been a remote concern to individual ship captains threat-
ened by imminent strikes from Israeli missiles. The pace was intensifying, as
Semenov’s 19 October journal entry makes clear: “Over the last few days, the sit-
uation has become so complicated, that it seemed we were just on the verge of
becoming engaged in war.”149
On 16 October, the cruiser Murmansk (Sverdlov class) and the destroyer
Naporistyi (Kotlin class/pr. 56PLO), both armed with guns only, replaced the
SSM-equipped cruiser Groznyi and a Kashin-class SAM destroyer trailing the
Independence south of Crete.150 Although the effect was to reduce the immediate
threat to the carrier, the rotation was conducted more for logistical reasons than
for diplomacy. Unable to replenish under way, the Groznyi and its escort had
been forced to proceed to an anchorage at “Point 15” (east of Crete) to refuel
from five support vessels.151 Semenov complained to his diary, “American ships
are all supplied by the giant Sacramento [AOE 1, first of the world’s largest class
of combat logistics ship]. Our planning is the apex of inventiveness and an over-
load of communications. Our vessels are not fit for the transfer of cargo at sea—
they are transporters of cargo from port to port! With envy I look upon the
[Americans’] giant floating warehouse!”152
As Israeli armored units crossed the Suez Canal on 17 October, preliminary
plans for a limited “demonstration” landing of Soviet naval infantry on the west
bank of the canal were drafted.153 Such an operation would not have been en-
tirely unprecedented—Captain First Rank V. I. Popov recalls that such a landing
had occurred in January 1968, in response to an Israeli attempt to secure the en-
trance to the Suez Canal.154
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A landing operation now would have been the same kind of a muscle-flexing
show of force as had occurred in the War of Attrition, but Moscow was probably
not contemplating direct intervention in the Yom Kippur War at this particular
point. Captain First Rank Vladimir Zaborskii, writing in 1999, notes that in
1973 logistics stood in the way of an amphibious landing. The bulk of the naval
infantry force was still in Sevastopol preparing for deployment into the Mediter-
ranean. One large and six medium landing ships were already in the region, but
they were all being used for equipment transport.155 Subsequently, the com-
mander in chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, ordered the al-
ready deployed landing ships to be used for troop transport and a landing force
to be assembled of “volunteers” from the crews of all combatant and auxiliary
ships. According to Semenov, there was no shortage of volunteers; some thou-
sand men signed up to fight Israeli forces on the ground.156 However, this resort
to volunteers is a sign that the eskadra was to some extent in over its head.
On 19 October, a semaphore message was sent from the commander of the
Sixth Fleet, Admiral Daniel Murphy, to Admiral Volobuyev asking that the So-
viet forces comply with the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement and not aim their
guns and missiles at U.S. Navy ships.157 The Fifth Eskadra staff was convinced
that U.S. jets and helicopters were in equal breach of the accord, but the Soviet
Foreign Ministry had received an official complaint from the U.S. State Depart-
ment, and the Mediterranean squadron was given orders from the chief of the
General Naval Staff to comply more closely with the agreement.158 This readjust-
ment in Soviet disposition and tactics was, however, short-lived.
By this time, Arab defeat was a foregone conclusion. On 19 October and again
on the 21st, Sadat appealed to the USSR to take immediate measures to broker a
cease-fire.159 The UN Security Council passed Resolution 388 on 22 October,
stipulating an end to all military action within twelve hours.160 The cease-fire
was welcomed by the warring parties, and on the Syrian front it held. However,
fighting continued on the east bank of the Suez Canal, where the commander of
the Egyptian Third Army—completely encircled by Israeli forces—ignored or-
ders from Cairo and made repeated attempts to break free.161 Israel immediately
took advantage of the broken cease-fire to continue its operations against the
beleaguered units and advance on Suez City.162
Phase 3
The third and perhaps the most dangerous phase of the war began during the
final hours of combat ashore and persisted, largely out of the public eye, for
another week. A second UN cease-fire went into effect on 24 October but also
failed to stop fighting on the Egyptian front, where Israel continued its assault
on the encircled Third Army.163
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Brezhnev now responded to continued Egyptian pleas for help by sending a
direct message to Nixon, stressing Israel’s violation of Security Council Resolu-
tion 388 and proposing a joint U.S. and Soviet peacekeeping effort to man the
cease-fire lines (as had been requested by Cairo). If Washington rejected the pro-
posal, Brezhnev continued, the Soviet Union would have to consider unilateral
intervention.164
The message was especially disquieting to Washington in light of increasing
Soviet activity in the Mediterranean. The number of Soviet ships there was now
eighty-eight, forty-seven of them combatants, including thirty-one surface
ships and over twenty submarines (four or five armed with surface-to-surface
missiles).165 Altogether, the force was capable of launching at least forty SSMs in
an opening salvo.166
In an alarming development, on the day of Brezhnev’s note to Nixon, a Soviet
surface group was sent to Port Said.167 It consisted of the Admiral Ushakov, the
SAM destroyer Otvazhnyi, the SAM destroyers Neulovimyi (Kildin) and
Soznatelnyi (Kotlin), the frig-
ate Voron (Riga class/pr. 50),
the tank landing ship
Voronezhskii Komsomolets (Al-
ligator class/pr. 1171), and the
medium landing ships SDK-83
and SDK-164 (Polnocny B
class), the latter three possibly
carrying the “volunteer” ma-
rine force ordered by Gorshkov.
Semenov remarked in his jour-
nal, “Seems we’re going to save
Port Said from Israel.”168
Even more ominously, Soviet airborne troops were placed on alert—seven di-
visions consisting of fifty thousand frontline troops and a hundred thousand
support troops, a force outnumbering the U.S. Marine contingent in the Medi-
terranean.169 Soviet pilots were also reported to be flying Foxbat/MiG-25 aircraft
from Egyptian airfields in reconnaissance missions over the battlefield.170
Predicting that the Sixth Fleet might consider preemptive action to prevent a
Soviet intervention, Volobuyev reinforced the Soviet anticarrier groups south of
Crete with SSM-equipped ships. The Groznyi, escorted by the Provornyi and the
gun destroyer Plamennyi (Kotlin) joined the gun-only ships already stalking the
Independence—the Volga, Naporistyi, and Murmansk.171 This move would also
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screen a potential Soviet airlift, as the Independence was then astride Soviet air
routes to Egypt.172
The Soviet force around Crete now included two gun cruisers (Murmansk
and Admiral Ushakov), eight SAM Kashin and modified Kotlin destroyers
(Krasnyi Kavkaz, Krasnyi Krym, Provornyi, Reshitel’nyi, Smetlivyi, Obraztsovyi,
Nakhodchivyi, and Soznatelnyi), and two Kotlin gun destroyers (Plamennyi and
Speshnyi). The amphibious forces maneuvering north of Port Said included four
large Alligator-class landing ships, Voronezhskii Komsomolets, Krymskii
Komsomolets, Krasnaya Pesnya, and BDK-104, five medium landing ships with
naval infantry on board, the SAM destroyer Otvazhnyi, and several gun destroy-
ers, including Naporistyi. The escort ships Voron, Kunitsa, and SKR-77 (all Riga
class) were in the same zone, as were two minesweepers.173
More ships were on their way. A large cruiser—most likely Moskva—and six
destroyers were declared through the Dardanelles.174 The Soviet airlift to the
Middle East had ceased, suggesting that the military transports (notably the
An-22, the largest Soviet transport plane) were being relieved to ferry the air-
borne troops.175 Two additional amphibious ships, together capable of carrying
a thousand fully equipped Soviet naval infantry, were expected to be deployed
from the Black Sea, and five additional Soviet submarines were en route to the
Mediterranean, which would make the Fifth Eskadra’s submarine force twenty-
eight strong.176
Early on 25 October, after a late-night cabinet meeting, the White House re-
sponded to Brezhnev’s message with a worldwide alert, moving to Defense Con-
dition 3.177 The JCS ordered John F. Kennedy, still west of Gibraltar, and Franklin
D. Roosevelt to join Independence in the eastern Mediterranean.178 Orders were
then given to suspend Navy support for the airlift to Israel, allowing all but two
escort groups to return to Independence and Roosevelt.179
Informed by Washington of the Soviets’ intentions and aggressively prodded
by the Americans to halt its military operations, Israel now did so.180 Plans for a
Soviet landing on the Suez Canal were called off, reportedly at the last minute.181
During the afternoon of 25 October, the USSR agreed to a plan to man the
cease-fire lines with a UN peacekeeping force that excluded both superpowers.182
On the following day Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger announced that
the United States had begun taking forces off of DefCon 3 status, but the Sixth
Fleet remained on highest alert.183 On that day, the Fifth Eskadra initiated inten-
sive anticarrier exercises against the carrier and amphibious task groups in the
eastern Mediterranean, using the actual U.S. ships as targets of simulated at-
tacks. A group shadowed the Independence, while two more ships joined the
anticarrier exercises and began trailing the Roosevelt task group. The anticarrier
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group (KUG-1) following Independence consisted of the cruiser Groznyi, the
SAM destroyer Provornyi, and the gun destroyer Plamennyi. KUG-2, stalking the
Franklin D. Roosevelt, consisted of the cruiser Murmansk (Sverdlov class) and the
gun destroyer Smetlivyi. The helicopter carrier Guadalcanal was targeted by a
third group (KUG-3), consisting of the cruiser Admiral Ushakov and the SAM
destroyers Neulovimyi and Reshitel’nyi.184 Submarines armed with antiship
cruise missiles also took part in the exercises, and more boats were coming
through the Gibraltar strait from the Northern Fleet.185
One significant addition to the surface force arriving through Gibraltar was a
Kresta II ASW/AAW cruiser (project 1134A); however, this ship remained in the
western Mediterranean until its departure in November.186 Yet another Soviet
anticarrier group (KUG-4), built around a Kynda-class SSM cruiser, entered the
Mediterranean on 29 October and began trailing the Kennedy group on the 31st.187
A f i f th str ike group
(KUG-5) began stalking
the Iwo Jima near Crete
(see maps). Two SSM-
equipped patrol vessels
( Na nu ch k a c l a s s / p r.
1234), escorted by a de-
stroyer, also entered on 31
October, marking the first
deployment of that class
of surface combatants.188
The Fifth Eskadra’s
force strength peaked on
31 October at ninety-six
units, including thirty-
four surface combatants
(five armed with SSMs)
and twenty-three subma-
rines (at least seven with
SSMs), constituting a
force capable of launching
eighty-eight SSMs in a
first salvo.189 The sixty U.S.
ships then present, includ-
ing three attack carriers,
two amphibious assault
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helicopter carriers, and nine attack submarines, found themselves in an increas-
ingly uncomfortable position, in which a preemptive strike seemed the most at-
tractive option should combat seem inevitable. Around each carrier were three
Soviet ships—two destroyers (one carrying surface-to-surface missiles, the
other surface-to-air) and one “tattletale” AGI capable of providing midcourse
guidance to SSMs fired from elsewhere.190
If the situation ashore had been defused, the crisis at sea not only persisted but
now reached its most dangerous stage. The four U.S. task groups were constantly
targeted for a Soviet attack. The three anticarrier groups trailing the U.S. carrier
groups could have launched first salvos of at least thirteen SSMs each against
their respective targets.191 Four Soviet cruise-missile submarines were on sub-
merged patrol nearby. The U.S. amphibious task force south of Crete was like-
wise shadowed by a group of five Soviet warships, some equipped with SSMs.192
In his 30 October journal entry, Semenov described the standoff: “Our forces
have very powerful cruise missiles and they are directed only at five objects—
three aircraft carriers and two helicopter carriers. All others are secondary. Ev-
erybody’s waiting only for a signal. The pressure has risen to the breaking
point.”193 Had war been evaluated as imminent, the Sixth Fleet carrier groups
would have needed to attack preemptively, by destroying the fire-control radar,
missile launchers, and gun mounts, or sinking outright every Soviet SSM-armed
combatant within range before the missiles could be released.
For its part, the Fifth Eskadra would have needed to incapacitate the Sixth
Fleet carriers before their aircraft and escorts had time to respond.194 The Soviet
mission, then, was to survive just long enough to deliver a devastating blow to
the enemy. The mood at the tactical level during the standoff echoed the Soviet
“battle of the first salvo” doctrine and the “we are kamikazes” mindset expressed
by Captain Semenov. With the exception of their submarines (which could
probably have fought for days or weeks after the surface fleets had been annihi-
lated), neither the Sixth Fleet nor the Fifth Eskadra had any alternative to a first
strike.195 An ex-Soviet submariner offers this assessment:
I think that [the Soviet submarine fleet] would have withstood [a U.S. first strike]. . . .
There was no reason to believe that our submarine had been discovered by the
probable foe . . . in October 1973. If so, then it is entirely possible that we could
have been the first to deliver the blow. . . . As far as the “fighting spirit” is concerned,
the sailors were entirely prepared to carry out any order. On a ship, especially on a
submarine, the execution of orders for the use of weapons is perceived somewhat ab-
stractly, and . . . to contemplate whether [the order] is good or bad—is the last
thing on one’s mind.196
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On a similar note, Admiral Murphy, the Sixth Fleet commander, writes that
the two fleets were “sitting in a pond in close proximity and the stage for the
hitherto unlikely ‘war-at-sea’ scenario was set. . . . Both fleets were obviously in a
high readiness posture for whatever might come next, although it appeared that
neither fleet knew exactly what to expect.”197
Once it became clear that there would be no commitment of Soviet ground
troops to the war zone, and in accordance with a suggestion that Admiral
Murphy had made to the JCS several days earlier, Washington authorized the
Sixth Fleet carrier groups to leave their operating area south of Crete and move
westward.198 The movement was delayed until 1600 on 30 October by heavy
weather, but once it began, tension rapidly eased. From a tactical standpoint, the
decision gave the U.S. task groups room to maneuver and disrupted targeting for
the Fifth Eskadra. On a strategic level, the White House was unquestionably
sending the Kremlin a signal that its forces were returning to a more relaxed pos-
ture.199 Fifth Eskadra forces began to disperse on 3 November.
Nonetheless, both fleets remained at high readiness for the following two
weeks.200 The general belief in the Fifth Eskadra continued to be that war could
break out at any moment and that the superpower standoff persisted, albeit in a
more limited form.201 On 6 November, a port visit by Volobuyev to Algeria was
canceled, and anticarrier activities resumed against the Kennedy, Roosevelt, and
Iwo Jima west of Crete.202 On 9 November, the SSM anticarrier group trailing the
Kennedy was relieved by gun ships and was sent for rest to Alexandria.203 Two
more anticarrier groups were disbanded later in the day, leaving three. The
Groznyi subsequently left for Sevastopol, and the Murmansk proceeded back
through the Strait of Gibraltar, heading for the Northern Fleet base at
Severomorsk.204 Despite constant requests to return the worn-out ships to
base, however, Gorshkov did not permit a more significant reduction of forces
until the Kennedy, Independence, and Roosevelt groups headed to port on 15
November.205 Thereafter, the Fifth Eskadra operations returned to combat train-
ing, repairs, and some much-needed time off for crews.206
“UPSTART” NAVAL POWERS
Several lessons can be drawn from this most ominous Cold War standoff at sea.
First, naval threats can emerge quickly. The Soviet Union, like the Russian Em-
pire before it, was a land power and had traditionally employed its navy in the
role of coastal defense. Its disparate fleets universally suffered from burdensome
geography—the Baltic Fleet from home waters that are completely frozen in the
winter, the Black Sea Fleet from the forbidding Turkish Straits, the Northern
Fleet from prohibitive distances and a frigid climate, and the Pacific Fleet from
its sheer remoteness, lack of efficient supply routes, and consequent
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underdevelopment. Nevertheless, only ten years after Nikita Khrushchev’s hu-
miliation during the Cuban missile crisis, when Soviet blue-water capabilities
were embryonic at best, the Soviet Navy had established a permanent presence,
and a very substantial threat to the U.S. Navy, in what had hitherto been a NATO
“lake.” Moreover, it accomplished this feat without permanent basing in the
region and despite having to deploy all units to the theater through NATO-
controlled choke points.
A second lesson is that tensions between the United States and its allies, and
other U.S. political decision-making constraints, can be effectively exploited
by adversaries to serve their strategic aims. Turkey, opposed to U.S. support for
Israel during the war, eased the Montreux Treaty restrictions on the Bosporus
and Dardanelles to permit Soviet use of airspace. This concession greatly aided
the air and sea lift to Syria and Egypt, and it allowed the Soviets to reinforce the
Fifth Eskadra rapidly during the crisis. Furthermore, because Washington felt
itself compelled to keep its forces in the eastern Mediterranean as a political
signal of U.S. readiness to counter unilateral Soviet moves during and after the
war, the Sixth Fleet’s carrier task forces were confined to fixed operating areas.
This greatly eased the Soviet anticarrier problem and forced the United States
into a difficult dilemma—to move the forces west and risk sending the wrong
message concerning U.S. resolve, or keep them on station in an unfavorable
tactical environment. As Admiral Zumwalt said of the Jordanian crisis that had
preceded, but was rather similar to, the 1973 crisis, “The terrible danger of that
last state of affairs is . . . that in a major crisis . . . the alternatives [became] back-
ing down (abandoning old principles and old friends) or escalation (risking a
global war).”207
A third lesson is that a strategic focus on “strike” ashore versus “sea control”
can result in doctrinal and tactical unpreparedness for interactions with “up-
start” naval powers. One former U.S. naval aviator who served in the Sixth Fleet
during the crisis explains that for the seven years before the Mediterranean cri-
sis, the strategic focus of the U.S. Navy had been on supporting the bombing
campaign in Vietnam. The priorities in that war, of course, had been carrier warfare
and close air support for troops in combat. Antisurface ship tactics and surface-
to-surface missiles, which were perhaps more appropriate for a close-proximity
war-at-sea scenario than was naval aviation, were insufficiently developed at the
time. It is apparent, then, that the mission of projecting force “from the sea” in
Vietnam had a debilitating effect on the fundamental U.S. Navy task of sea
control.208
Another lesson, which is especially resonant in today’s age of unparalleled
U.S. prowess in military technology, is that the technology gap felt by the Soviets
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during the crisis seems not to have appeared crippling to them. In the words of
one participant:
It’s no secret that our ships had many flaws in their construction. Furthermore, we
were behind in the development of computer technology, in fact very seriously so, in
radio-location and in electronic warfare. The loudness of our nuclear submarines
was also no secret. We knew about all these drawbacks, and tried to solve the prob-
lem. . . . [However,] by the assessment of our commanders, all ships in the Fifth Op-
erational Eskadra performed with sufficient effectiveness during the Arab-Israeli
War. All the while, a certain level of expertise was accumulated with regard to trailing
and delivering blows onto aircraft carriers.209
Although the asymmetry in capabilities between the two fleets was unquestion-
ably acute, as it was for the duration of the Cold War, the Soviet strategy was
largely free of illusions to the contrary. In fact, it was oriented specifically to off-
setting this lack of parity.
The Mediterranean standoff contrasts strikingly with its more famous prede-
cessor, the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Whereas the Soviets in 1962 lacked the le-
verage to use their navy as an effective instrument of diplomacy, this was not so
in the Mediterranean in 1973. In the Caribbean, the United States benefited
from superiority on all levels. The impressive display of U.S. deterrent power
fully reflected these advantages. Due to its ability to mount a blockade, the
United States was essentially able to control the direction and outcome of the
crisis. The Kremlin, having tried to establish a new status quo in the region, was
publicly forced to retreat from this gambit, with attendant humiliation. The
1973 crisis, however, saw a much greater degree of parity between the United
States and the Soviet Union. The United States had fewer options and failed to
seize the initiative. This failure enabled Moscow, through bold naval diplomacy,
to influence significantly the pace and outcome of the Mediterranean crisis, de-
spite the obvious inadequacies of its client states.
This research may be most applicable today to considering the rise of China.
The experience of confronting the Fifth Eskadra in 1973 might be reason for
Washington to approach the question of China’s maritime prospects with some-
what greater caution. Like Russia, China has historically been a continental
power. If Soviet sailors had to reach back to the days of Peter I and Catherine II to
find Russian naval heroes, the Chinese are forced to go still farther back into his-
tory—to the exploits of the early Ming. In the modern era, Chinese fleets have
borne humiliations comparable to the Tsushima Straits debacle of the Russian
Navy in the Russo-Japanese War. Like the Soviet Navy, the contemporary
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has been widely overshadowed by
ground forces. Despite an impressive collection of ex-Soviet carriers that are
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now museums in various parts of China, the PLAN’s prospects for developing
carrier aviation remain bleak.210 Finally, it is generally agreed that the PLAN has
yet to find its own “Gorshkov.”
It is not surprising, therefore, that Washington takes China to be a naval up-
start and that few there take it seriously as a maritime power. That is a grave mis-
take. The Vietnam conflict distracted the U.S. Navy from its core competency
of sea control, and the global war on terror could offer the PLAN a similar
opportunity.
In some respects, China is a much more natural maritime power than the
USSR ever proved to be. Aside from its lengthy coastline, with its numerous shel-
tered anchorages, Beijing does not confront the ubiquitous ice, immense dis-
tances, isolated geographical outposts, and the narrowly confined straits that
always burdened Russian sea power. Chinese capitalism is full of vitality;
Beijing’s merchantmen increasingly dominate maritime commerce in a way to
which the Soviets could never have aspired. Perhaps most importantly, Beijing
has in the Taiwan question a maritime strategic issue that serves as a focal point
for naval development. With the possible exception of Berlin, Moscow never had
this kind of strategic focus—certainly not one that consistently encouraged its
maritime aspirations. Moreover, Taiwan is less than a hundred miles off the Chi-
nese coast—a much more amenable environment for operations than was the
Mediterranean for the Fifth Eskadra.
As we consider Chinese maritime power, therefore, it is useful to reflect on the
success that the Soviets achieved under much more adverse conditions. The
1973 episode, perhaps the most dangerous of all Cold War maritime crises, of-
fers a lesson in humility for the world’s supreme naval power.
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